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A central feature of representative democracies is the delegation of decision-making power to political
representatives by the electorate. Electoral systems play hereby a crucial role because they shape
electoral incentives and the legislative environment in which public policies are made. Theories of
electoral systems show that a plurality system encourages politicians to represent the interests of their
local district, while politicians in a proportional system typically seek support among broad social
groups (Austen-Smith, 2000; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Myerson, 1993;
Persson and Tabellini, 2003). A central prediction emerging from these models is that plurality systems
favor spending on goods that can be targeted locally, while the proportional system fosters spending on
goods with bene￿ts that are not speci￿c to a local clientele. How these di⁄erent incentives a⁄ect overall
government spending is theoretically much less clear.
To analyze the e⁄ects of electoral systems on ￿scal policy however, faces a number of empirical
challenges: for one thing, constitutional reforms are relatively rare. In addition, sharp di⁄erences
between electoral systems are typically only observed across countries, not within a single country.
The combination of cross-sectional variation in electoral systems across di⁄erent countries makes the
identi￿cation of ￿scal e⁄ects di¢ cult.
The methodological innovation of this article is that we exploit unique variation in electoral systems
at the state and local level in Switzerland to estimate the e⁄ect of proportional representation on ￿scal
policy. Our setting has a number of attractive features. Switzerland￿ s federalist system created consid-
erable variation in electoral rules at the sub-national level. Some states (￿ cantons￿ ) use a proportional,
others a plurality system to elect their parliament. Hence, we can use institutional variation at the
sub-national level to carefully analyze the link between electoral system and economic policies. Since
all cantons share a common history, our approach reduces problems of unquanti￿able historical and
institutional di⁄erences inherent in cross-country studies. Further, we can use rare exogenous variation
in electoral rules for local governments to better address the problem of policy endogeneity (Acemoglu,
22005; Aghion et al., 2004). For local elections, many cantons in Switzerland mandate proportional or
plurality rule. Since these mandates have been imposed several decades ago, they are plausibly uncor-
related with current local ￿nances, local political factions or other social conditions in a community.
Finally, our analysis investigates a historical milestone of constitutional reform in Western Europe,
the switch from plurality rule to proportional representation. In 1890, all cantons, like all democratic
countries around in the world, elected their state legislatures under a plurality system. Over the next
110 years, 23 of the 25 cantons in Switzerland have switched to proportional representation. Today,
only two cantons exclusively rely on plurality rule to elect their parliament. Hence, our setting provides
a unique opportunity to identify the in￿ uence of proportional representation from geographical and
temporal variation within the boundaries of a single country. Though pioneering, Swiss cantons were by
no means the only political units that have adopted the new electoral system. On the contrary, many
states in Europe and elsewhere switched to proportional representation after 1890. The ￿rst country
to adopt it at the national level was Belgium in 1899; Germany followed in 1918, Ireland in 1919 and
France in 1945. We therefore believe that our analysis is valid beyond the particular Swiss setting.
The second, substantive contribution of this article is that we uncover new evidence on the theoretical
mechanism of the reduced-form estimates. Electoral systems not only yield distinct electoral incentives.
They also di⁄er in the organization of the legislature they create. Proportional systems often result
in politically fragmented legislatures and coalition governments. As demonstrated by Weingast et al.
(1981) and others (e.g. Poterba and von Hagen, 1999), political fragmentation creates a ￿ common-
pool problem￿when projects bene￿t a particular group but are ￿nanced by the entire jurisdiction.
Because legislators value the full bene￿ts of spending projects for their constituency, but internalize
only a part of their costs, logrolling among politicians will result in more government spending. Recent
models however argue that proportional representation might actually produce more homogenous party
platforms (Lizzeri and Persico, 2009) and fewer relevant decision-makers because of party discipline
(Carey and Shugart, 1995). Both should reduce the common-pool problem associated with political
3fragmentation. Our empirical analysis separates the e⁄ects of changes in political fragmentation from
that of political representation and electoral incentives. In particular, we test for the ￿rst time whether
political fragmentation, though higher under proportional representation, creates less of a common-pool
problem than in a plurality system.
Our main ￿ndings can be summarized as follows. Proportional representation has strong e⁄ects
on the composition of government: it shifts spending away from geographically targeted transfers to
roads and agricultural subsidies toward spending on education and welfare that bene￿t broad social
groups. Speci￿cally, we ￿nd that a proportional system raises education expenditures by 12 percent,
welfare expenditures by 30 percent, but also decreases road expenditures by 50 percent and agricultural
subsidies by 21 percent.
We ￿nd little evidence that proportional representation results in larger government spending or
revenues. The absence of an e⁄ect on overall spending is driven by o⁄setting forces. On the one hand,
the stronger political representation of left-wing interests in proportional systems increases spending by
6.6 percent. On the other hand, we ￿nd evidence that political fragmentation leads to less overspending
in a proportional system. While common-pool problem arising from political fragmentation increases
spending in a plurality system (32 percent), this e⁄ect is essentially absent in a proportional system.
This ￿nding is consistent with greater party discipline or stronger convergence of party platforms,
which reduces the relevant number of political interests in a proportional system. Consistent with our
reduced-form estimates, we ￿nd that the net e⁄ect of these changes on total spending is zero.
An important concern with our empirical strategy is that unobservable factors may be correlated with
spending and the decision to adopt a proportional system. We conduct a number of validity tests at the
canton and local level which demonstrate that the link between electoral reform and public spending
is indeed causal. First, we compare local spending in communities that have exogenously imposed
proportional representation to spending in communities with imposed plurality rule. We ￿nd no evidence
that spending is higher in communities with mandated proportional rule. Across all speci￿cations,
4our analysis of communities strongly supports the ￿ndings at the canton level. Second, we present a
number of dynamic panel estimators to account for serial correlation and potential nonstationarity in
our spending variables. Our results remain unchanged and remain statistically signi￿cant even after
standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004).
Third, we show that the relationship between proportional system and public spending is robust to
controls for other political and social reforms during that period, such as direct democratic participation
rights, the adoption of direct elections for the executive and women￿ s su⁄rage. Further, allowing for
canton-speci￿c linear trends or canton-speci￿c decade dummies to capture unobservable trend di⁄erences
between cantons or the e⁄ect of canton-speci￿c shocks does not change our qualitative results. Fourth,
we ￿nd few meaningful relationships between the adoption of proportional representation and the timing
of other political and institutional reforms. Fifth, we show that attempts to reform the electoral system
that did not ultimately lead to proportional representation have little e⁄ect on public spending. Taken
together, the results for canton and local governments suggest that it was the adoption of proportional
representation itself that shifted the scope of government but did not increase its overall size.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the most relevant
strands of literature. Section 3 describes the historical background surrounding the adoption of propor-
tional elections. The data and empirical strategy is presented in section 4. We present our canton-level
results in section 5 and corroborate our ￿ndings at the local level in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
The two prominent electoral systems used in democracies today, plurality and proportional system, can
be broadly characterized as follows: candidates in a plurality system are elected in a large number of
voting districts (e.g. single-member districts). The seat is then awarded to the candidate with the
highest share of votes in that district (winner-takes-all or ￿rst-past-the-post system). In a proportional
system in turn, seats in the legislature are distributed in a small number of (or even a single) voting
5districts and are assigned based on the share of votes for the candidate￿ s party.1 We now discuss how
these di⁄erences a⁄ect electoral incentives and the organization of the legislature.
2.1 Electoral Incentives and Legislative Organization
Theories of the electoral system typically assume two-party competition in which candidates choose two
di⁄erent policies: one with bene￿ts for many voters (￿ broad good￿ ), and a second one, which can be
targeted to subsets of voters (￿ targetable good￿ ). A central prediction emerging from these models is
that candidates elected in a plurality system will spend more on the targetable good and less on the
good with di⁄use bene￿ts than candidates elected in a proportional system (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001;
Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003).
This prediction holds irrespective of whether the electoral system is de￿ned by the electoral rule
(Lizzeri and Persico, 2001), or the numbers of districts (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Persson and Tabellini,
2003), in which representatives are elected. Candidates facing plurality rule have stronger incentives
to target spending on voters that secure their majority, while votes above the majority are discarded.
Under proportional rule in contrast, every vote counts. A similar conclusion emerges when electoral
systems are distinguished by their district size. Candidates elected under plurality system are elected in
many small districts. To win the majority, candidates want to spend more in highly contested districts.
In both cases, a plurality system encourages spending on goods that are targetable to pivotal voters
relative to goods with di⁄use bene￿ts.
How electoral incentives a⁄ect total spending under the two systems is less clear. First, total spending
might be higher or lower in proportional systems depending on voter preferences over targetable spending
relative to broad transfers (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002). If the median voter values targetable goods,
total spending will be higher in a proportional system.2 The e⁄ect on total spending also depends on
1Electoral systems may also vary along other, more subtle dimensions. See Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Lijphart
(1994) and Cox (1997) for a thorough discussion of real-world electoral systems.
2The reason is that proportional representation also encourages spending on broad transfers. The sum of spending on
goods with broad and those with targetable transfers in the proportional system will then exceed spending in a plurality
system which is concentrated on targetable goods.
6the relative strength of electoral competition. Plurality systems might impose barriers to entry because
the chances of success for alternative candidates from the same party are low in single-member districts
(Myerson, 1993).3 As a consequence, the e⁄ect of proportional representation on the overall size of
government is theoretically ambiguous.
The existing models assume two-party competition, and hence take the organization of the legislature
as given.4 However, a large literature in political science has documented that proportional systems
increase the number of parties and political fragmentation in the legislature (Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1967;
Lijphart, 1990; Persson et al., 2007; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson
(1981) provide an early formalization of the consequences of political fragmentation in a plurality system.
In their model, representatives are elected in their speci￿c district, but spending decisions are ￿nanced
by general taxation. Candidates then have an incentive to target spending toward their support base.
Since the costs are borne by all taxpayers, this gives rise to a ￿ common-pool problem￿ : each candidate
favors more spending on projects that bene￿t their voters, while they consider only a fraction of the
overall cost.5 Their model predicts that spending increases as the pool of decision-makers over the
budget gets larger (Austen-Smith, 2000; Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006; Poterba and von Hagen, 1999).
Does this prediction also apply to the proportional system where candidates are elected in large or
nationwide districts? There are at least two reasons why the e⁄ect of political fragmentation might
be weaker in a proportional system. One argument is that the electoral system has an e⁄ect on the
policy platforms chosen by parties. As shown by Lizzeri and Persico (2009), policy platforms are
typically less risky (hence, closer to each other) in a proportional than in plurality system. The e⁄ect
3In addition, electoral competition, which reduces wasteful spending, might be more or less intense in a plurality
system. On the one hand, competition among candidates is stronger in the highly contested districts because the return
of winning is high in a plurality system (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). On the other hand, electoral competition is lower
in ￿ safe￿districts.
4Standard spatial models in contrast, do not yield sharp predictions. In a model with two parties and linear taxes,
we obtain the full convergence of policies. With three parties, two parties are symmetrically located around the median
in equilibrium, while the third party with the fewest votes is located at the median. Policies are chosen by a coalition
between the small party and one of the large parties. Actual policies might then be above or below the desired policy of
the median voter (e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988).
5A large public ￿nance literature has stressed the importance of common-pool problems for delaying ￿scal adjustment
(see for example, Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Poterba und von Hagen, 1999).
7on party platforms suggests that political di⁄erences between parties might actually be smaller in a
proportional system (see Ezrow, 2009 for cross-country evidence consistent with this hypothesis). While
the number of decision-makers is certainly higher under proportional representation, actual divergence
of positions might be lower, which would dampen the overspending bias inherent in common-pool
models. A second reason political fragmentation might have less damaging e⁄ects in a proportional
system is party discipline. If party leaders have control over the nomination of political candidates,
policy positions among candidates of the same party might be more homogenous, and party discipline
in parliamentary decisions more pronounced (see Carey and Shugart, 1995 for the theoretical argument
and Norris, 2004 for empirical evidence). Hence, while the sheer number of bargaining partners is larger
in a proportional system, the true number of decision-makers might be lower and hence less prone to
overspending.
Finally, parties in a proportional system could target voters that would not be pivotal in a two-
party system (Lizzeri and Persico, 2005).6 The adoption of proportional representation would then also
a⁄ect the set of interests represented in parliament. During our study period, the workers￿movement
gained political in￿ uence which increased left-wing representation in the parliaments after the adoption
of proportional representation. To the extent that left-wing supporters prefer more government, this
change in representation results in more spending.
In sum, our discussion yields the following empirical tests: ￿rst, governments in a proportional system
provide more spending with di⁄use bene￿ts to society but spend less on targetable goods. Second, the
e⁄ect on the size of government is theoretically ambiguous. Third, a politically fragmented legislature
spends more if elected in a plurality system. The e⁄ect of political fragmentation on spending might be
less pronounced in a proportional system. Finally, spending increases in the parliamentary strength of
groups with a more demand for government.
6Alternatively, voters in a proportional system might actually strategically elect candidates with a preference for social
transfers rather than candidates with a taste for locally targetable goods (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002).
82.2 Empirical Studies
The existing empirical literature on proportional representation is based on cross-country data (Aidt et
al., 2006; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Their analyses reveal that welfare
spending is correlated with having a proportional system. The correlations for the overall size of
government are less conclusive and seem to depend on the speci￿c country sample.
This study makes two important contributions to this literature. Our methodological contribution
is that we rely on variation in constitutional rules at the sub-national level which reduces concerns of
omitted variables. Speci￿cally, we draw on Swiss data on state and local governments to investigate the
e⁄ects of proportional representation within the boundaries of a single country.7 An analysis at the sub-
national level is especially attractive because electoral systems typically vary along many dimensions
across countries, which are di¢ cult to characterize with existing data. In contrast to earlier studies,
our identi￿cation is based on the di⁄erential timing of constitutional reform across individual cantons.
Hence, we can control for ￿xed di⁄erences across cantons and unobservable canton-speci￿c trends or
shocks to identify the e⁄ects of proportional representation on ￿scal policies. Further, we can employ
plausibly exogenous variation at the local level to bolster our con￿dence in interpreting the canton
estimates as causal.
Our second substantive contribution to the literature is to shed light on the theoretical mechanism
driving the reduced-form estimates. While the theory of electoral systems is by now well developed,
we know little about the precise mechanism behind the empirical correlations. Our setting allows us
to shed light on how electoral incentives and changes in the organization of the legislature a⁄ect policy
choices and quantify for the ￿rst time their relative importance for ￿scal policy.
In addition, our article also contributes to the literature on political fragmentation and ￿scal policy
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Baqir, 2002; Bradbury and Crain, 2001; Chen and Maholtra, 2007; Gilligan
and Matsusaka, 2001; Poterba and von Hagen, 1999). A common theme in this literature is that political
7In a paper complementary to ours Gagliarducci et al. (2009) test for the accountability of politicians elected under
di⁄erent electoral systems in Italy￿ s mixed proportional system.
9fragmentation, measured, for example, by size of the legislature or number of parties in the government,
increases overall spending and de￿cits.8 We contribute to this literature because we can test for the
￿rst time whether the e⁄ects of political fragmentation (in the legislature) di⁄er by electoral system.9
3 Historical Background10
Before 1890, all cantons in Switzerland had a plurality system in place.11 Between 1890 and 1992,
twenty-three out of the twenty-￿ve cantons switched to proportional representation.12 The ￿rst column
of table 1 shows the year when each canton ￿rst elected the legislature under the new rule. In 2000, only
two cantons, Appenzell-Innerrhode and Grisons, still rely exclusively on plurality rule. A few cantons
(see column (2) of table 1) use a mixed proportional system, which we code as a proportional system.
For example, in 1992, Uri adopted the proportional system in districts with more than two mandates,
i.e. about three-quarters (or 47 out of 64) of its voting districts. However, the results are not sensitive
to this classi￿cation (see section 5.4). We next discuss which forces led to the large-scale constitutional
reforms in the cantons over the past century.
8We abstract from fragmentation of the executive here because we do not know the party composition of the executive
only its overall size. Further, we observe few changes in the size of the executive which will be absorbed by canton ￿xed
e⁄ects. Finally, the executive in each canton is directly elected over most of our period and hence little a⁄ected by electoral
reform of the legislature, which is the focus of this article.
9We also show that the rising political in￿ uence of left-wing parties is associated with more government. While this
association has been documented for the post-war period (see, Blais et al., 1993; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008; Tavares, 2004),
we establish this link over a much longer time period - ever since the working class became a relevant political force in
Switzerland in the late nineteenth century.
10This section builds on Gruner (1977), Kl￿ti (1901), Saripolos (1899) and Vatter (2002). Detailed discussions of the
Swiss electoral system can be found in Garrone (1991), Giacometti (1941), K￿lz (1987), Lutz and Strohmann (1998),
Moser (1987) and Poledna (1988).
11A few cantons (for example, Geneva) exclusively relied on plurality rule where the candidate with the largest share
of votes in each district is elected. Most cantons however rely on a mixture of majority and plurality rule. Hence, the
absolute majority of votes (50 percent) is required in the ￿rst round, while in the second round only the relative majority
among the remaining candidates is needed to win a seat.
12The canton Jura was founded in 1978 and hence is excluded from the analysis.
103.1 Political Con￿ ict and the Struggle for Electoral Reform
Switzerland￿ s population has been divided into Catholics and Protestants ever since the Reformation.
This ideological split led to violent clashes, for example, the war in 1847 (Sonderbundskrieg) and the
cultural con￿ ict (Kulturkampf ) of the 1870s.13 In the political arena, the rift was mirrored in the long-
lasting struggle between conservative forces supported by the Catholic population and the liberal-radical
movement backed by the Protestants. Only in a few cantons was one party able to maintain political
dominance over a prolonged period of time. In many other cases, alternating majorities and often
temporary coalitions between liberal and conservative groups were the rule rather than the exception.
The social changes following industrialization added a new dimension to the existing con￿ ict. As
in many European countries, industrialization saw the rise of a sizeable working class, especially in the
urban centers. Though industrialization in Switzerland occurred early in the century, it was not until the
second half of the nineteenth century that workers became politically organized. The Social-Democratic
party ￿rst emerged in 1850, building on earlier voluntary associations (Gr￿tlivereine). Yet, the workers￿
candidates were rarely able to secure a majority of votes under plurality rule; and even if they did, they
never achieved a majority of seats (Gruner, 1977; 1978).
In this climate of political con￿ ict and unstable majorities, the new system of proportional represen-
tation promised to accommodate the diverging political interests and to generate a more stable political
environment (see the contemporaneous discussion in Kl￿ti, 1901 and Saripolos, 1899). The prevalence
of plurality voting also came increasingly under scrutiny as ruling parties manipulated voting registers
to secure their vulnerable political positions. It was common practice, for example, not to count out-of-
canton migrants as part of a canton￿ s population, which lowered the number of representatives elected
in rapidly growing urban districts.14 Here, proportional representation suggested a compromise in the
13While the con￿ ict in 1847 largely took place between Catholic, conservative cantons (Appenzell-Innerrhode, Appenzell-
Outerrhode, Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden and Nidwalden) and those with Radical-liberal governments, there were also violent
con￿ icts between the two groups in Fribourg, Lucerne, Valais and Zug (Vatter, 2002). The cultural con￿ ict of the 1870s
between the Catholic church and the state involved the educational responsibilities and privileges of the Catholic church.
14Unlike present debates about plurality systems, gerrymandering, i.e. the manipulation of district boundaries by
politicians was not an issue in the Swiss cantons at the time. The reason is that voting districts are tied to historical
political units, especially communities and county boundaries (Bezirke or Kreise). Furthermore, number and boundaries
11acrimonious battle over the assignment of seats to voting districts.
3.2 Explaining the Pattern of Electoral Reform
Understanding the determinants of electoral reform in the cantons is important for evaluating the va-
lidity of our empirical strategy. The discussion in the last section suggests a set of common factors
driving electoral reform. First, con￿ icts arising between two, equally strong parties backed by religious
di⁄erences were an important motor in the early adopting cantons. The ￿rst adopters of proportional
representation illustrate this point. In Ticino (adoption in 1891), plurality rule and ￿xed voting districts
produced an increasingly unequal distribution of seats, which led to violent street ￿ghts. The con￿ ict
escalated to the point where the federal government intervened and mandated proportional representa-
tion. In Geneva (adoption in 1892), changing majorities in each of the three districts generated unstable
electoral outcomes which again resulted in ￿erce con￿ ict.
In contrast, industrialization and the rise of left-wing parties played an important role in many
cantons adopting between 1900 and 1945 (e.g. the city cantons Basle or Zurich). Here, electoral reform
was often pushed on the political agenda by a coalition of new left-wing parties and existing minority
parties, which hoped to improve their political position.15 After 1950, proportional representation was
typically introduced when cantons abolished their communal meetings (Landsgemeinden) in favor of
more representative forms of government.
These common factors driving electoral reform could potentially in￿ uence public spending decisions
directly. For example, con￿ ict between heterogeneous groups might lower spending if the groups disagree
about the provision of public services (see Alesina et al., 1999). Similarly, the rising working class might
have a higher demand for government services like clean water or unemployment insurance. To account
for these in￿ uencing factors, we control in all our speci￿cations for religious (and linguistic) heterogeneity
of voting districts are typically ￿xed in the canton constitutions and hence, any changes require approval by the electorate
in a referendum.
15It might have been the speci￿c balance of power among established parties rather than the mere political threat posed
by left-wing parties that favored electoral reform in the early twentieth century (Lutz and Zila, 2007).
12and the size of the industrial sector. Furthermore, we show that the strength of direct democracy does
not a⁄ect our estimates.
Beyond these factors, there seems little systematic pattern of adoption. For example, we ￿nd no
evidence that certain geographic regions were more likely to adopt proportional representation than
others. Figure 1 shows that many cantons that switched prior to 1919 (when proportional representation
was adopted for federal elections) are located in the East (lighter shade). But so are the two cantons
that still rely exclusively on plurality rule (dark color). We discuss the plausibility of our identi￿cation
strategy in more detail in section 4.2. and further probe its validity in section 5.4 and 6.
3.3 Political Consequences of Electoral Reform
The adoption of proportional representation had immediate e⁄ects on the composition of canton par-
liaments. Parties dominant under plurality rule typically experienced a decline in their number of seats
in parliament.16 For example, the seat share of the Radicals in Solothurn dropped from 85 percent to
62 percent in the ￿rst election under proportional rule in 1895.17 Instead, the number of parties with
seats in the legislature increased from on average 3.5 to 4.3 parties in the new proportional system.
This development was in part driven new parties as existing organizations split into several factions or
previously unorganized groups founded new political parties after electoral reform.
Moreover, previously excluded or underrepresented groups now gained legislative representation in
proportion to their popular support. Left-wing parties immediately increased their political weight in
many canton parliaments. On average, their share of seats rose from 7.1 percent under the old system
to 19.7 percent under proportional system (t-statistic: 17.4). There are however large di⁄erences across
cantons: left-wing seats quadrupled in Basle City (from 7 percent to 28 percent) and other cities like
16This raises the question of why dominant parties under plurality rule would ever agree to electoral reform. The
exploration of this question is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research (see also Lutz and Zila, 2007;
Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010).
17An alternative way to assess changes in representation under the proportional system would be to calculate the
proportionality between number of votes and seats in the legislature (see Besley and Preston, 2007). Unfortunately,
we do not have data on vote shares of parties in canton parliaments available to us before the switch to proportional
representation.
13Zurich or Lucerne. Left-wing parties in contrast did never play an important role in more rural cantons
like Nidwalden, Zug or Valais.
4 Data and Empirical Strategy
4.1 Data
To analyze the consequences of the shift to proportional representation, we assembled a rich new data set
for all Swiss cantons between 1890 and 2000. For each canton, we collected information on government
expenditures and revenues, the electoral system and socio-demographic characteristics. Data on ￿scal
policy and canton characteristics are compiled from Historical Statistics of Switzerland (Ritzmann-
Blickenstorfer, 1996), multiple volumes of the Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland, and the Swiss decennial
Census. A detailed description of the data sources is provided in Appendix A, and a separate web
appendix is available from the authors.
We extracted information on the electoral system and other political institutions by examining all
past and current canton constitutions and relevant electoral laws. We complemented and cross-checked
this information with cantonal archives (personal communication) and secondary sources (Lutz and
Strohmann, 1998; Kl￿ti, 1901; Schoop, 1987; SociØtØ d￿ histoire et d￿ archØologie du canton de Neuch￿tel,
1989; Wicki, 2006). The institutional measure for the electoral rule in canton parliaments is a binary
indicator, which takes a value of one if a canton has a proportional or mixed proportional rule and zero
if plurality rule is in place.18 When a canton switches from plurality rule to proportional representation,
the indicator is zero until the ￿rst election took place under the new rule. It is one in the year of the
￿rst election under proportional representation and all years thereafter.
Our main outcome variables are the log of canton expenditures and revenues per capita in a given
year. Both are available annually over the entire period. To analyze whether proportional representation
18Note that our estimates should be interpreted as the combined e⁄ect of electoral rule and district magnitude since
cantons using proportional rule also have a smaller number of voting districts.
14increases the provision of spending for large segments of the population, we collected information on
expenditures for education and welfare. The cantons bear the sole responsibility for secondary education,
which is predominantly provided publicly. Spending on welfare includes social assistance to the poor
and social security payments. Our measure of welfare spending contains strong elements of insurance
against poverty and provisions for old age which bene￿t a large share of the population. Data on welfare
are available since 1930, data on education expenditures since 1890.
To test whether spending in plurality systems is targeted toward geographic constituencies, we
compiled data on expenditures for roads and subsidies to agriculture. Spending on canton roads can
be easily targeted geographically while agricultural activities are highly concentrated in certain regions.
Agricultural subsidies are available since 1930 and expenditures for roads since 1925. Education and
welfare expenditures are measured per capita, while expenditures for roads and agricultural subsidies are
expressed per 1,000 inhabitants.19 All expenditure and revenue variables are de￿ ated to Swiss Francs
in 2000. Information on the electoral rule is only available in election years while expenditures and
revenues are recorded annually. For non-election years, we assign the electoral rule used in the last
parliamentary election. The annual panel allows us to evaluate the e⁄ect of the electoral system on
government spending in both election and non-election years.
We complement the panel with Census data on the social, demographic and economic conditions,
e.g. the age structure, population size and the share of people living in cities above 10,000 inhabitants.
We also have information on the importance of industrialization, calculated as the percentage of the
workforce that is employed in manufacturing and agriculture. We control for population heterogeneity by
calculating Her￿ndahl indices for three religions (Protestant, Catholic and Jewish) and three linguistic
groups (French, Italian and German-speaking). Our fragmentation measure, calculated as one minus
the Her￿ndahl index, is closer to zero if one group dominates and approaches one if the groups are equal
19Our observed spending categories do not sum to total expenditures as several categories (e.g. spending on adminis-
tration, law enforcement, public transport or water and sewer services) are not available in the early decades of the 20th
century.
15in size.20 Religious and linguistic heterogeneity are both substantial in Switzerland ranging from zero to
0.76 and 0.87 respectively. Finally, we collected further details of the political system from the canton
constitutions: the size of parliament, the electoral cycle, the introduction of women￿ s su⁄rage, direct
democratic participation rights and whether the president of the executive is directly elected. Table 2
shows summary statistics of all variables used in the empirical analysis.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
Exploiting the geographic and temporal variation in the adoption of proportional representation af-
ter 1890, we use a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach to estimate its e⁄ect on public spending. More
speci￿cally, for canton c in year t; we estimate models of the form:
Yct = ￿c + ￿t + ￿Propct + ￿
0Xct + uct (1)
where Yct denotes the log of annual expenditures per capita in a speci￿c policy area. The variable Propct
represents the electoral system. The variable is a binary indicator equal to zero as long as the legislature
is elected according to plurality rule. The indicator switches to one when the parliament is ￿rst elected
according to proportional rule, and all years thereafter. The parameter of interest in equation (1) is ￿.
Our speci￿cations also include canton (￿c) and year (￿t) ￿xed e⁄ects. Year ￿xed e⁄ects absorb
common shocks such as the two World Wars or economic depression. Canton ￿xed e⁄ects are impor-
tant because there are strong, persistent di⁄erences between German-speaking and French- or Italian-
speaking cantons. For example, our detailed study of canton constitutions reveals that some cantons
allow their citizens to recall the government, while others do not. These institutional di⁄erences are
highly persistent over time and we expect them to in￿ uence politicians￿behavior.
Because Swiss cantons might di⁄er along other dimensions, we further include a number of time-
20For example, if the shares of the three groups are 0.3, 0.3 and 0.4, then the Her￿ndahl index is 0.34 and our measure
of fragmentation 0.66. If their shares are 0.1, 0.1 and 0.8 instead, the Her￿ndahl index is 0.66 and the measure of
fragmentation 0.34.
16varying variables Xct. To control for di⁄erences in the demand for government services, we add the age
structure of the population and the size of the urban population. Population size is included to allow
for economies of scale in the provision of public services. Federal subsidies adjusts for di⁄erences in the
resources available to cantons.
One variable that is not available in our data set is canton income (or wages). We use several
variables to adjust for di⁄erences in wealth: the percentage of the population owning a car, the number
of physicians per 1,000 population and the infant mortality rate. The three variables alone explain 43
percent of the variation in canton income between 1965 and 2000 when we have income data available.
Once we include our other controls and canton and year ￿xed e⁄ects, we can account for 93 percent of
the variation in canton income. Hence, the absence of a direct income measure is not a major limitation
of our study.
In our econometric framework, the timing of adopting proportional representation is assumed to be
uncorrelated with the error term conditional on all our control variables. Is this identifying assumption
plausible? We have come to the conclusion that our identi￿cation strategy is plausible given the evidence
in section 5 and 6. Our detailed study of the history in the individual cantons (see section 3) revealed that
industrialization and population heterogeneity are important forces driving electoral reform. Hence, all
our speci￿cations include measures of religious and linguistic fragmentation and the size of the industrial
sector.21 We also ￿nd no evidence that related political reforms like women￿ s su⁄rage, di⁄erences in
direct democratic institutions or other political events a⁄ect our results. Further, ￿xed di⁄erences
across states and common shocks in government spending are all purged from the estimate of ￿. In the
robustness analysis, we allow for canton-speci￿c linear trends and more ￿ exible canton-speci￿c decade
dummies that purge our estimate of ￿ from all linear unobservable canton trends and even nonlinear
canton-speci￿c shocks. These ￿ exible speci￿cations, like extensive tests to capture the dynamics and
21One concern might be that proportional representation itself a⁄ects population heterogeneity through selective mi-
gration. In that case, our speci￿cation would capture only the e⁄ect of proportional representation net of its impact on
population heterogeneity. Empirically however, we do not ￿nd that proportional representation is associated with changes
in population heterogeneity or internal migration in the decades after adoption.
17serial correlation in our spending variables, leave our results unchanged. We probe the validity of
our identifying assumption further in section 5.4. below and corroborate our ￿ndings using exogenous
variation at the local level in section 6.
5 Canton-level Results
5.1 Broad Services and Targeted Transfers
We ￿rst test whether politicians shift to spending with broad bene￿ts after proportional representation
is adopted. Our measures for broad spending are the log of expenditures for education and welfare.
The ￿rst speci￿cation includes the proportional variable, our set of canton controls and year e⁄ects.
The second speci￿cation also includes canton ￿xed e⁄ects to absorb permanent di⁄erences in political
structure and preferences for government across cantons. The results in Table 3 show that proportional
systems spend more on goods with broad constituencies: cantons that adopted proportional represen-
tation spend 10 percent more on education (column (2)) and 33 percent more on welfare (column (4))
than under plurality rule.
The control variables have the expected sign. More subsidies from the federal level have a positive
e⁄ect on education and welfare spending. Urbanization is associated with more welfare spending but
also less education spending. The latter may re￿ ect economies of scale in the provision of schools in
densely populated areas. The coe¢ cient on log population is strongly negative in the ￿xed e⁄ects
speci￿cation, suggesting substantial economies of scale in the supply of education. With respect to
ethnic and religious fragmentation, we ￿nd con￿ icting results: linguistic heterogeneity reduces spending
on education but religious heterogeneity increases it. One explanation is that the French-, Italian- and
German-speaking populations have di⁄erent preferences for public services, which makes it di¢ cult to
reach a political agreement about their provision (Alesina et al., 1999).
Our second empirical test is whether spending on geographically concentrated goods declines after
18the adoption of proportional representation. The dependent variables are now the log of expenditures
for roads and agricultural subsidies. The control variables are the same as before. The right-hand side
of table 3 shows that expenditures for roads are indeed 53 percent lower (column (6)) while agricultural
subsidies are 28 percent lower (column (8)) when parliaments are elected under proportional rule.
In sum, our estimates show that the adoption of proportional rule shifted the scope of public spending
away from locally targetable transfers toward spending for broad social groups. Our results extend
previous ￿ndings from cross-country data that countries with a proportional system have more social
spending than countries with a plurality system (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Persson and Tabellini,
2003). While our estimated coe¢ cients seem large, the e⁄ects are actually smaller than previously
found. For example, Persson and Tabellini (2003) report that social security and welfare spending
(measured relative to GDP per capita) are 2 to 3 percent higher in countries with proportional system.
Our estimate of 33 percent higher welfare spending in cantons with proportional rule is equivalent
to a 1 percent higher spending on welfare plus social security (in terms of GDP per capita in 2000).
The ￿ndings con￿rm that the adoption of a proportional system change the electoral incentives of
representatives: they rely less on local groups but rather seek the support of broad social groups even
if these are geographically dispersed.
5.2 Size of Government
As discussed above, the e⁄ect of proportional rule on the overall size of government is theoretically
ambiguous. We estimate the same model in (1) where the dependent variable is now the log of total
expenditures or total revenues per capita. The results are reported in table 4. Column (1) shows that
cantons switching to proportional representation have 4 percent higher expenditures than cantons with
a plurality rule. The same pattern emerges on the revenue side where cantons with proportional rule
have 2.8 percent higher expenditures, though the coe¢ cient is not statistically signi￿cant.
Once we rely on within canton variation, we ￿nd that proportional representation is not associated
19with any change in expenditures (column (2)).22 Proportional rule does however, lower government
revenues by 2.8 percent though the coe¢ cient is only marginally signi￿cant (column (4)). These results
of similar spending patterns but fewer revenues suggests that parliaments elected under the proportional
rule are more likely to run de￿cits.
The control variables in both the expenditure and revenue regressions have the expected signs. Fed-
eral subsidies, an important source of revenues, are again associated with higher spending. Population
size (in logs) lowers expenditures which suggests substantial economies of scale. Also, linguistic and
religious heterogeneity result in less spending in the ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation.
Our results on total spending di⁄er from most of the previous ￿ndings that are based on cross-
country data. Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) report positive results
for their sample of OECD countries while Aidt et al. (2005) ￿nd weakly negative results for Western
Europe. If we analyze the cross-section, we also ￿nd a positive e⁄ect on total spending (see columns (1)
and (3) in table 4). Hence, one possible explanation is that permanent di⁄erences in political institutions
or voter preferences across countries drive the positive correlation between proportional representation
and spending found in previous studies.
5.3 Political Fragmentation and Left-Wing Representation
Thus far, we have been silent of what mechanism underlies our reduced-form estimates. Economic theory
suggests that electoral systems a⁄ect not only electoral incentives but also changes the composition of
the legislature. This section investigates how these forces in￿ uence total spending.
We ￿rst examine how proportional representation changes political fragmentation and the left-wing
representation in the legislature. We measure fragmentation in three ways: by the number of legislators,
the number of parties with seats in the legislature and by party fragmentation. This last measure is
calculated from the seat distribution of six di⁄erent parties; the remaining, smaller parties are collapsed
22Taagepera and Shugart (1989) argue that election results under proportional rule with very small district magnitudes
( seats
districts ￿ 6) yield seat shares close to those obtained under plurality rule. In our data however, the vast majority of
canton-year observations (85 percent) have a district magnitude of six or higher under proportional representation.
20into a single category (￿ other￿ ). Hence, we will underestimate the actual degree of political fragmentation
in canton parliaments. Party fragmentation is then calculated as one minus the Her￿ndahl index
of concentration; it varies from zero to one, with larger values indicating a more fragmented party
structure.
We also investigate how the political representation of left-wing parties changes with political rep-
resentation. The variable is de￿ned as the share of seats held by the Social Democrats. Estimates
based on all left-wing parties, which includes seats held by the Communist party, are very similar and
not reported here. As controls, we include in our regressions population heterogeneity, the share of
urbanization and population size measured in logs.
The results are presented in table 5. We ￿nd that proportional representation has strong e⁄ects
on the composition of parliament: it increases party fragmentation by 0.14 or more than one standard
deviation and the number of parties by 0.6 or about 6/10 of a standard deviation. In addition, the rep-
resentation of left-wing parties increases by 6 percent or 1/2 of a standard deviation under proportional
representation. The e⁄ect on the overall size of the legislature is in contrast small. Parliaments elected
under proportional rule have on average 2.4 seats more, which corresponds to a mere 1/20 of a standard
deviation. These ￿ndings suggest that fragmentation along party lines and the political in￿ uence of
left-wing parties indeed increases in canton parliaments with proportional representation.
Given these substantial changes in party composition under proportional rule, we next investigate
how fragmentation and left-wing representation a⁄ect public spending after electoral reform. As a
benchmark, the ￿rst speci￿cation in table 6 reruns the baseline speci￿cation from table 3 for the sub-
sample of years and cantons for which we have valid party information. The coe¢ cient on proportional
representation is very similar to the one estimated for the full sample for both expenditures (column
(1)) and revenues (column (4)).
To uncover the theoretical mechanism, we now add in a ￿rst step the measures of legislative frag-
mentation and left-wing representation to our baseline expenditure and revenue regressions. We expect
21both changes to raise spending overall. In a second step, we then allow the e⁄ect of party fragmentation
to vary by electoral system. If party discipline and homogenous party platforms reduce the number of
actual decision-makers, the e⁄ect of party fragmentation would be less pronounced in a proportional
system than in a plurality system.
Results for the ￿rst step are shown in column (2) and (5) of table 6. As expected, a higher seat
share for left-wing parties and also in general party fragmentation increase spending. In contrast,
the raw number of parties and legislature size have no e⁄ect. Based on the estimates and observed
changes with the adoption of proportional representation, we can calculate the relative impact of party
fragmentation and left-wing representation. We ￿nd that left-wing representation has the strongest
correlation with ￿scal policy: it increases spending by 6.6 percent (0.511*0.219). The overall e⁄ect
of political fragmentation (independent of the electoral system) is to raise spending by 4.1 percent
(0.291*0.142).23
In a second step, we now test whether proportional representation reduces the common pool prob-
lem associated with party fragmentation. Hence, we include an interaction e⁄ect between party frag-
mentation and proportional representation (shown in column (3) and (6)).24 If the e⁄ect of political
fragmentation is muted in a proportional system, this interaction term should be negative. Strikingly,
the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is indeed negative and highly statistically signi￿cant. While po-
litical fragmentation raises spending by 32.2 percent (0.611*0.533) in a plurality system, it has almost
no e⁄ect in a proportional system ((0.611-0.572)*0.675=2.6 percent).25 While party fragmentation is
23Conditional on the compositional changes in the legislature, the coe¢ cient on the proportional rule is -7.4 percent.
One interpretation of the negative coe¢ cient is that the median voter does not value targetable goods a lot. The negative
coe¢ cient could also re￿ ect barriers to entry which limit electoral competition in a plurality system and encourage
politicians to spend more than in a proportional system. The ￿rst explanation is very di¢ cult to test; the second
explanation seems somewhat unlikely given the evidence that rent-seeking behavior is less common among politicians
elected under plurality rule (see Gagliarducci et al., 2009). Here, we suggest and test a very di⁄erent explanation: that
the e⁄ect of party fragmentation is lower in a proportional system because of party discipline and more homogenous party
platforms.
24We also estimated a speci￿cation that allows for interaction e⁄ects of proportional rule with left-wing representation,
the number of legislators and number of parties. None of these additional interaction e⁄ects were statistically signi￿cant
at conventional levels.
250.533 denotes the mean party fragmentation in a plurality system and 0.675 the respective value in a proportional
electoral system.
22substantially higher under proportional rule, we ￿nd no overspending bias associated with it.26 Further,
once we allow for the di⁄erential e⁄ects of party fragmentation, the coe¢ cient on the proportional rule
is positive though only borderline signi￿cant. This is consistent with less intense electoral competition
in a proportional system (see the related evidence in Gagliarducci et al., 2009).
In sum, we ￿nd strong evidence that party fragmentation and the share of seats for left-wing parties
increases after the adoption of proportional representation. Overall, both changes lead to more spend-
ing. The o⁄setting factor is that party fragmentation has little impact on spending in a proportional
system. The net e⁄ect of these forces is that overall government size does not change after the switch
to proportional representation (the sum of all e⁄ects is a mere 0.2 percent higher spending).
5.4 Informal Validity Tests and Robustness Checks
Natural concerns with this paper￿ s empirical strategy include potential biases arising from serial corre-
lation and dynamics in the spending variables, the possibility of endogenous adoption of proportional
representation and the in￿ uence of other political events that are confounded with proportional repre-
sentation. This section presents a range of informal validity tests and robustness checks that investigate,
but fail to corroborate these concerns.
First, our reduced-form estimates in table 3 and 4 would be biased if persistent spending shocks,
e.g. during the economic depression or the two World Wars, are correlated with the decision to adopt
proportional representation. To address this issue, we implement a number of dynamic panel estimators
to account for serial correlation and spending dynamics (shown in table A1). First, we add the lagged
dependent variable as an additional control. While speci￿cations with lagged dependent variable and
￿xed e⁄ects are typically biased, this bias should be small in our case because the number of time periods
(T = 110 years) is large relative to the number of cross-sectional units (N = 25 cantons). Alternatively,
we implement the Arellano-Bond estimator for dynamic panel data (row (2)). Both dynamic panel
26Unfortunately, we cannot test with our historical data whether this result is driven party discipline in actual policy-
making or by the convergence of party platforms during the electoral stage. However, we think that uncovering this
di⁄erential e⁄ect of political fragmentation is of interest in its own right.
23speci￿cations yield similar results to our baseline estimates. An alternative way to control for serial
correlation is to use spending changes as our dependent variable. The estimates for spending changes
in row (3) are substantially weaker, but again qualitatively similar. If all spending variables exhibit the
same type of nonstationarity, we can eliminate nonstationarity in the data by using spending shares.
Again, our results based on spending shares as dependent variables (row (4)) are very similar.
Second, our standard errors may be severely downward biased if spending is highly persistent
(Bertrand et al., 2004). In view of our relative small number of cantons, we implement the before-after
estimator suggested by the authors. We regress spending net of all control variables on the dummy for
proportional representation for the sample of cantons that adopted the new electoral system. While
the standard errors in row (5) of table A1 are somewhat larger than in the baseline, the statistical
signi￿cance of our estimates is not a⁄ected.
Third, we investigate if our results are driven by unobserved political liberalization rather than the
actual adoption of proportional representation. In that case, we should observe detectable spending
adjustments during reform attempts that did not ultimately result in the adoption of proportional
representation. Hence, we rerun our estimation in table 3 and 4 using the years of failed reform at-
tempts rather than our indicator for proportional rule as our main independent variable. The placebo
experiment shown in table A2 in the appendix shows that failed initiatives (columns (1) and (2)) and
failed parliamentary petitions (columns (3) and (4)), with one exception, do not explain changes in
expenditures.
Fourth, we test whether the timing of adoption is related to socio-economic conditions (popula-
tion size, population heterogeneity, employment and age structure, labor force participation, federal
subsidies) or other democratic reforms (direct election of executive, adoption of direct democratic par-
ticipation rights, founding of social-democratic party in the canton) in 1890 when all cantons still have
a plurality system in place. Table A3 in the appendix shows that only religious heterogeneity and
the existence of a law referendum are associated with an earlier electoral reform. Since we control for
24population heterogeneity in all regressions and test for the in￿ uence of the law referendum below, these
correlations do not a⁄ect our conclusions.
Fifth, we analyze whether our results are driven by unobservable canton trends or exceptional politi-
cal conditions just prior to electoral reform. For example, a year of intense political con￿ ict between two
major parties might result in lower overall spending. To test for the in￿ uence of canton-speci￿c events
prior to electoral reform, we add dummies for the ￿rst, ￿rst three and ￿rst ￿ve years to the baseline
speci￿cation. The coe¢ cient on the proportional variable is now identi￿ed net of spending decisions
up to ￿ve years prior to the actual reform. Row (1) in table A4 shows that the results remain un-
changed. More generally, we could miss unobserved canton-speci￿c trends. We test for this by including
canton-speci￿c linear trends (row (2)) and more ￿ exible canton-speci￿c decade dummies (row (3)). The
latter speci￿cation allows for any unobservable shock to a⁄ect cantons di⁄erentially, for example, the
two World Wars. The results for the individual expenditure categories remain unchanged. For linear
trends, the e⁄ect on overall spending is positive though only signi￿cant at the ten percent level. One
interpretation is that spending in non-adopting cantons followed a steeper upward trend than adopting
cantons. However, we do not ￿nd this pattern for the individual expenditures categories and with the
more ￿ exible decade dummies.
Sixth, we check whether other plausible socio-economic or political changes can explain our results.
Speci￿cally, we test for the in￿ uence of the demand for democratization by including the number of
years since the executive has been directly elected and controls for direct democratic participation rights
(provisions for the law referendum, budget referendum, the signature requirement for the voter initiative
and whether the canton relies on community meetings) in each canton (row (4) in table A4). We also
control for the extension of voting rights to women (row (5)) and more broadly the in￿ uence of change in
social values by adding the divorce rate and share of protestants (row (6)). We further control for other
political reforms that could a⁄ect spending such as changes in the size of the legislature and executive
as well as the electoral cycle (row (7)). The results clearly reveal that controlling for these political,
25institutional and social changes has little e⁄ect on our estimates.
Finally, we assess the robustness of our results to alternative speci￿cations of the spending and
electoral variables. Row (8) exclude cantons with a mixed proportional system, and row (9) restricts
the sample to election years. The last speci￿cation uses the level of expenditures as the dependent
variable. For all expenditure categories, we ￿nd the same e⁄ects for the scope of government and no
e⁄ect on the size of government.
6 Evidence from Local Governments
Despite the robustness of our ￿ndings, a remaining concern might be that other omitted time-varying
unobservables a⁄ects both spending and the decision to adopt proportional representation. In this
section, we use exogenous variation at the local level in Switzerland to show that these concerns are un-
warranted. Using a variety of empirical strategies, we again ￿nd no e⁄ect of proportional representation
on local public spending.
6.1 Electoral Systems and Data at the Local Level
Local communities in Switzerland provide a unique setting to analyze the e⁄ect of proportional rep-
resentation. The roughly 3,000 communities enjoy substantial ￿scal autonomy: a local income tax
provides an independent source of revenues. They also make important spending decisions in the areas
of primary schooling, welfare and other local services (￿re, police, garbage collection etc.).
Their ￿scal autonomy notwithstanding, Swiss communities are restricted in their choice of electoral
systems. Many cantons impose mandates for local elections: some mandate proportional rule, others
plurality rule. Since these mandates are set at the canton level, they are exogenous from the perspective
of the individual community. Furthermore, mandates have been in place for a long time and have proved
di¢ cult to change. Ticino and Zug, for example, mandate proportional representation at the local level
since 1891 and 1894 respectively. As such, canton mandates are not in￿ uenced by current local ￿nances
26or socio-economic conditions correlated with local public ￿nances.
Our ￿rst empirical strategy compares the size of government in communities where proportional
representation is mandated to spending in communities where plurality rule is mandated. This analysis
relies on a comparison of communities across cantons with di⁄erent mandates. Our second empirical
strategy compares communities in cantons that do not impose mandates. Using a matching estimator, we
compare spending in communities with plurality rule to those with proportional rule. Since this approach
allows us to compare similar communities located in the same canton, we control for unobservable
di⁄erences across cantons.
We base our analysis on a survey of each community￿ s head administrator in four di⁄erent years
(1988, 1994, 1998 and 2005).27 The survey asks detailed information on the political structure of local
governments. The response rate in each wave is over 75 percent. As our measure of local spending, we use
the number of administrative personnel per capita. Administrative spending captures genuine di⁄erences
in the size of government because the provision of public goods and services require a bureaucracy for
administration. Further, wasteful spending or rents for local politicians are often associated with more
bureaucracy. Finally, administrative expenditures are highly correlated (0.8) with the overall size of
government at the canton level.
The typical community has two levels of local government: the executive and legislative. The
executive (often called Gemeinde- or Stadtrat) is the most important political body. It has on average
six members and is directly elected by the electorate.28 Only about 20 percent of communities have
a parliament as their legislative body; all others rely on community meetings of its citizens instead.
To avoid a highly selected sample, we study the in￿ uence of the electoral rule for the legislature and
executive.29 The e⁄ect of proportional rule on ￿scal policy should be qualitatively similar for the two
27We are very grateful to Professor Ladner from the University of Berne for making the data available to us. Details
of the survey, questionnaires and data are available at http://www.andreasladner.ch/gemeindeforschung/. An in-depth
description of the data can be found in Ladner (1991) and Ladner et al. (2000).
28Only in Neuchatel, the executive is elected by local parliaments.
29A second reason to include the executive is that we only have information on the electoral rule for the legislative in
1988. Though we contacted all communities with a parliament by email to request information on their electoral system
after 1988, the response rate was only around 30 percent.
27political bodies (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini, 2003).
We code mandates from each canton￿ s constitution, additional laws on local a⁄airs and information
in Ladner (1991). Our main variable of interest is a binary indicator equal to one if a canton dictates
proportional rule and zero if majority rule is mandated. We calculate this variable separately for the
executive and legislature. Since electoral rules and mandates in particular are persistent over time, our
estimates rely on variation across communities for identi￿cation.30
To control for observable community characteristics, we match our survey to information from the
1980, 1990 and 2000 Swiss census. Census data provides information on the size of the community,
its age structure, the employment rate, the fraction employed in agriculture or industry, the share of
protestants and whether the community is located in the Alps. We used linear interpolation to create
annual observations and kept the observations from the survey years for the analysis. Table 7 reports
summary statistics for our local data.
6.2 Results from Mandates and Matching
We ￿rst compare spending in communities that are subject to canton mandates. Speci￿cally, we compare
the size of local administration in communities with mandated proportional rule to communities with
mandated plurality rule. Sixteen cantons mandate plurality rule for the executive, while two cantons
mandate proportional representation. We cannot perform a similar analysis for the legislative as no
canton mandates plurality rule. Because mandates are imposed at the canton level and persistent over
time, they are exogenous from the perspective of the individual community.
We estimate a regression model similar to (1), where the dependent variable is administrative person-
nel per capita in a community (in logs).31 To control for observable di⁄erences, we include year dummies,
30Between 1988 and 2005, two cantons abolished their mandate for majority rule (Appenzell-Innerrhode in 1996 and
Lucerne in 2004). In the two cases, the canton mandate is one before the change and zero thereafter.
31We choose the log speci￿cation to be consistent with our canton estimates. In the raw data, the number of adminis-
trators is zero for about 5 percent of the sample (N=431). The zeros seem to be actual zeros only in the small number of
communities with a population below 200. In larger communities, the zeros are likely to be missing values. For the log
speci￿cation, we dropped communities with no reported administrator. We ￿nd, however, similar results if we reestimate
the relationship in levels.
28the fraction of children under 15, detailed controls for population size, the share of protestants, the frac-
tion of nonemployed and employees in agriculture or mining. We also add the dominant language of the
canton, and whether the community is located in the mountains to adjust for time-invariant cultural
and geographic heterogeneity. Standard errors are clustered at the canton level.
Our benchmark estimates (columns (1) and (2)) in table 8 show the relationship for all communities
that choose their electoral rule. We ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant correlation between the size of public
administration and the electoral rule for the legislature (column (1)) or the executive (column (2)). A
comparison of the ￿rst two columns con￿rms our earlier intuition that the electoral rule has similar
e⁄ects irrespective of the political body (legislature or executive). These results are also consistent with
the zero e⁄ect found at the canton level.
Next, we estimate the same regression for communities with mandated electoral rule for the execu-
tive. The main independent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the community has mandated
proportional rule to elect its executive and zero if plurality rule is mandated. Column (3) shows that
communities with mandated proportional rule do not have larger local administrations than communi-
ties with mandated plurality rule.32 However, we might still be concerned that cantons with mandated
proportional rule di⁄er from cantons with mandated plurality rule along some other unobservable di-
mension.
To address this concern, we further restrict the analysis to communities located close to the border
between cantons with di⁄erent mandates. Ticino (a canton mandating proportional rule) is located
South of Uri (a canton mandating plurality rule). Using GIS maps to identify border communities,
we compare communities located at the Northern border of Ticino with communities located at the
Southern border of Uri . We use the same approach to match communities in Zug to communities
in Aargau, Lucerne, Schwyz and Zurich. To the extent that unobservables change smoothly with
32The results remain unchanged if we add controls for a local parliament or additional demographic variables to the
speci￿cation. Results are similar if we drop the two cantons that abolished their mandates; they are also unchanged if we
exclude cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants, which tend to have more than one voting district. Results are available
upon request.
29geographic distance (and are uncorrelated with canton borders), the sample of border communities
yields unbiased estimates. Reassuringly, we ￿nd that communities separated only by a canton border
have very similar socio-demographic characteristics. Estimation of the same relationship on our sample
of border communities again shows no statistically signi￿cant relationship between electoral rule and
the size of public administration (column (4) in table 8).
Another way to address the concern of unobserved di⁄erences across cantons is to rely on comparisons
within the same canton. Hence, we repeat the estimation with communities located in cantons without
mandates on local elections (Berne, Fribourg, Solothurn, Basle County, Grisons, Thurgau, Valais and
Jura). Here, we eliminate unobservable permanent heterogeneity across cantons because we compare
only communities that lie in the same canton. In a ￿rst step, we estimate a logit model of choosing
proportional representation to control for observable di⁄erences between communities choosing di⁄erent
electoral rules. The predictor variables are the same as those used in the regressions above. We then
implement propensity score matching to match communities with similar observable characteristics in
the same canton but di⁄erent electoral rules (under the assumption that the control variables eliminate
selection bias). The results of the logit model and the implied treatment on the treated e⁄ects are
reported in table 9. For both the legislature (column (1)) and executive (column (2)), we ￿nd no
evidence that communities with proportional rule have more local administration than their matched
counterparts.
In sum, the evidence from local governments using mandates and matching con￿rms our ￿ndings
at the canton level: proportional representation for the parliament or the executive does not generate
bigger governments.
7 Conclusion
Using variation in the adoption of proportional representation across cantons and electoral mandates
for local governments in Switzerland, this article demonstrates that electoral systems have important
30implications for ￿scal policy. Under proportional rule, politicians need the support of broader segments
of the population. Accordingly, public spending shifts away from targeted subsidies for narrow groups
and encourages spending on broad services like education.
Our ￿ndings do not support concerns that proportional rule results in larger governments. Across
a variety of methods and levels of government, we ￿nd little evidence that proportional representation
increases overall spending. We present novel evidence for the theoretical mechanism driving these results.
Stronger representation of left-wing parties increase public spending. In contrast, party fragmentation,
though higher with proportional rule, has little e⁄ect on spending in proportional systems. This result
is consistent with recent models that stress party discipline and convergence of policy platforms in a
proportional system. Both party discipline and homogenous party platforms reduce the actual number
of decision-makers and the variability of political positions which reduce the overspending inherent in
plurality systems.
Though pioneering, Swiss cantons were by no means the only political units that adopted the new
electoral system. Many countries in Europe and elsewhere switched to proportional representation since
1890; other countries, for example Canada and the United Kingdom, actively debate to adopt it. While
Switzerland has, for example, a much stronger direct democratic tradition than other democracies, the
e⁄ects of proportional representation remain unchanged even conditional on provisions for initiatives and
referendums. We therefore believe that our analysis is valid for developed democracies more generally.
Certain features of the Swiss electoral system might however mitigate overspending in a proportional
system. Most importantly, voters in Switzerland are able to accumulate votes for a single candidate,
which strengthens accountability of politicians. Furthermore, most cantons allow citizens to combine
candidates from di⁄erent party lists (￿ panachage￿ ) rather than choose between closed party lists. As
open lists tie the election outcome of individual candidates closer to their performance, this could foster
accountability and reduce overspending. An electoral reform that restricts voters to party lists and
single, non-transferable votes might be associated with higher spending. Finally, in contrast to pure
31parliamentary systems, Swiss citizens elect the canton executive directly. The independence of the
executive might also help to foster spending discipline (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Baqir, 2002
for evidence). The Swiss case however clearly demonstrates that it is not proportional rule per se that
promotes bigger governments.
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A Canton-Level Data
This appendix describes the data sources and construction of variables for the 25 Swiss cantons. We
drop the canton Jura in our analysis, which was founded only in 1978. Our main outcome variables
for the size of government are canton expenditures and revenues. Both are taken from the annual
publication ￿ Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz￿for 1890 to 1950 and from ￿ ￿⁄entliche Finanzen der
Schweiz￿for 1950 to 2000. All expenditure and revenue categories are expressed per capita and de￿ ated
to 2000 Swiss Francs using the annual consumer price index reported in Schuppli and Studer (2004).
35Year PR Mixed   Seats in 
Adopted System Parliament
Adopted prior to 1919:
Ticino (TI) 1891 90
Geneva (GE) 1892 100
Zug (ZG) 1894 X 80
Neuchatel (NE) 1895 115
Solothurn (SO) 1896 144
Schwyz (SZ) 1900 X 100
Basle City (BS) 1905 X 130
Lucerne (LU) 1911 170
St. Gallen (SG) 1912 180
Zurich (ZH) 1917 180
Adopted 1920-1950: 
Basle County (BL) 1920 90
Glarus (GL) 1920 80
Thurgau (TG) 1920 130
Aargau (AG) 1921 200
Fribourg (FR) 1921 130
Valais (VS) 1921 130
Berne (BE) 1922 200
Vaud (VD) 1949/1962 180
Adopted 1950-2000: 
Schaffhouse (SH) 1952 X 80
Nidwalden (NW) 1982 60
Obwalden (OW) 1986 55
Uri (UR) 1992 X 64
Not Adopted: 
Appenzell Outerrhode (AR) N/A X 65
Appenzell Innerrhode (AI) N/A 46
Grisons (GR) N/A 120
Source: Lutz and Strohmann (1998)
Table 1: Electoral Systems of Swiss Cantons in 1998
Notes: The table shows the main institutions of each canton´s electoral system and its
evolutionover time. The first column showsthe first year the cantonparliament was elected
under the new proportional rule. Vaud had a mixed electoral system between 1949 and
1962 before adopting a pure proportionalsystem in 1962. Appenzell-Outerrhode allows its
districts to adopt proportional representation since 1997 but only one (Herisau) out of six
has chosen to do so. Appenzell-Innerrhode and Grisons still have a majoritarian system in
place. Observations Mean Std.  Dev Min Max
Electoral and Party System
Electoral Rule (1= Proportional/Mixed) 2775 0.62 0.49 0 1
% Social Democratic Party 2038 17.74 10.99 0 48.46
Number of Parties 2038 4.47 1.06 2 7
Party Fragmentation Index 2038 0.65 0.12 0.23 0.82
Size of Parliament  2483 119.55 49.75 32 257
Fiscal Policy Variables (log per capita)
Expenditures 2775 7.16 1.26 4.42 9.85
Revenues 2775 7.14 1.27 4.52 9.91
Education 2775 5.25 1.57 0.82 8.44
Welfare 1775 5.60 1.03 1.07 8.16
Roads (per 1,000 inhabitants) 1900 5.59 1.11 0.05 9.30
Agriculture (per 1,000 inhabitants) 1775 4.80 1.18 0.41 7.55
Federal Subsidies (per 1,000 inhabitants) 2700 5.34 1.17 2.32 8.74
Control Variables
Age 0 to 19 (in %) 2775 33.79 6.79 15.71 45.78
Age 20 to 39 (in %) 2775 29.98 2.55 23.14 39.21
Age 40 to 64 (in %) 2775 26.79 3.47 17.84 36.48
Age 65 and older (in %) 2775 9.44 3.56 3.75 21.03
Population (log) 2775 11.64 1.10 9.45 14.02
Urban Population (in %) 2775 25.62 25.58 0 100
Employed in Agriculture (in %) 2775 20.28 13.89 0.22 74.37
Employed in Manufacturing (in %) 2775 43.56 11.34 13.80 71.46
Car Ownership (in %) 2775 12.27 16.69 0 59.20
Physicians (per 1,000 population) 2775 0.89 0.48 0.05 3.76
Infant Mortality Rate (per 100,000 births) 2774 52.37 48.54 0.00 286.03
Linguistic Fractionalization Index 2754 0.21 0.17 0 0.76
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Canton-Level Data, 1890-2000
Linguistic Fractionalization Index 2754 0.21 0.17 0 0.76
Religious Fractionalization Index 2770 0.35 0.18 0 0.87
Foreigners (in %) 2775 11.34 7.71 1.52 40.66
Protestants (in %) 2775 0.40 0.29 0.01 1.00
Divorced (in %) 2775 2.05 1.92 0 9.64
Mandatory Budget Referendum 2775 0.62 0.49 0 1
Signature Requirement Initiative 2775 2.43 1.82 0.003 8.5
Law Referendum  2746 0.62 0.49 0 1
President of Executive Directly Elected? 2775 0.24 0.43 0 1
Electoral Cycle (in years) 2032 3.83 0.67 2 6
Notes: The unit of observation is a canton-year pair. Spending and revenues are deflated to 2000 Swiss Francs. Expenditures for agriculture and
roads as well as federal subsidies are per 1,000 inhabitants, all other expenditure and revenue categories are per capita. Total expenditures,
revenues and education spending are available for 1890-2000, road expenditures since 1925, welfare and agricultural spending since 1930.
Urban population reflects the share living in cities above 10,000 people. Linguistic and religious fractionalization are calculated as one minus the
Herfindahl index. A larger value indicates a more fragmented population structure. The infant mortality rate is the number of children dying before
the age of 1 among 100,000 births. The number of doctors is measured per 1,000 inhabitants. The variables for law referendum and budget
referendum are binary indicator equal to one if they are mandatory and zero otherwise. The voter initiative is measured as the signature
requirement in percentage of the eligible population.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Proportional Representation 0.174 0.101 0.201 0.331 -0.237 -0.528 -0.392 -0.275
(0.026)*** (0.022)*** (0.039)*** (0.051)*** (0.045)*** (0.067)*** (0.050)*** (0.058)***
Population Size (log) 0.068 -0.111 -0.13 0.249 -0.062 0.244 0.124 -1.041
(0.011)*** (0.063)* (0.015)*** (0.149)* (0.021)*** (0.153) (0.022)*** (0.140)***
% Urban Population 0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.005 -0.013 -0.004 -0.011 0
(0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.001)*** (0.001)
Federal Subsidies (log) 0.052 0.134 0.124 0.101 0.328 0.134 0.407 0.36
(0.020)*** (0.014)*** (0.030)*** (0.028)*** (0.032)*** (0.033)*** (0.044)*** (0.036)***
% Employed in Agriculture -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.04 -0.041 -0.002 0.041 0.028
(0.003)* (0.003)*** (0.004)* (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005) (0.004)*** (0.004)***
% Employed in Industry 0.007 0.005 -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 0.033 0.033 0.01
(0.002)*** (0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)**
Car Ownership (in %) 0.019 0.004 0.019 0.02 0.032 0.031 0.007 0.047
(0.003)*** (0.003) (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007) (0.006)***
Doctors per capita 0.039 -0.073 0.221 0.297 0.198 -0.143 -0.572 -0.36
(0.038) (0.036)** (0.060)*** (0.069)*** (0.060)*** (0.073)* (0.082)*** (0.081)***
Infant Mortality Rate (per 100,000) 0.001 0.0001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Linguistic Fractionalization 0.828 -0.721 -0.177 -0.253 0.979 -1.258 1.123 -2.591
(0.065)*** (0.157)*** (0.088)** (0.236) (0.102)*** (0.283)*** (0.118)*** (0.269)***
Religious Fractionalization 0.289 0.375 0.133 -0.379 -0.729 1.3 -0.911 1.301
(0.081)*** (0.135)*** (0.105) (0.253) (0.119)*** (0.244)*** (0.134)*** (0.247)***
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2690 2690 1774 1774 1899 1899 1774 1774
R-squared 0.94 0.97 0.86 0.92 0.83 0.9 0.82 0.93
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of real per capita spending on the categories shown in the first row (all expressed in Swiss Franks at 2000 prices). Expenditures for
roads are available since 1925, those for welfare and agriculture since 1930. The variable proportional representation is a binary indicator equal of 1, if a canton has a
proportional or mixed proportional system, and 0 in the case of a majoritarian system. Population is measured in logs, while urban population is calculated as the percentage of
people living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants. Federal subsidies are the monetary transfers from the federal level measured in logs. Car ownership is the percentage
of the population that owns a car while the number of doctors is measured per 1,000 inhabitants. The infant mortality rate is the number of children dying before the age of 1
among 100,000 births. Linguistic and religious fractionalization are measured as Herfindahl indices based on 3 groups respectively. All specifications include year fixed effects
and controls for the age structure of the population, even columns also control for canton fixed effects. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
Table 3: Proportional Representation and the Scope of Government
Welfare Education Agriculture Roads(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportional Representation 0.04 0.01 0.028 -0.028
(0.017)** (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)*
Population Size (log) -0.149 -0.036 -0.143 0.014
(0.008)*** (0.045) (0.008)*** (0.048)
% Urban Population 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Federal Subsidies (log) 0.092 0.129 0.081 0.113
(0.013)*** (0.010)*** (0.013)*** (0.010)***
% Employed in Agriculture -0.023 -0.006 -0.025 -0.009
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
% Employed in Industry -0.015 0.002 -0.015 0.001
(0.001)*** (0.002) (0.001)*** (0.002)
Car Ownership (in %) 0.026 0.015 0.025 0.015
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Doctors per capita 0.021 0.171 0.035 0.221
(0.030) (0.028)*** (0.032) (0.031)***
Infant Mortality Rate (per 100,000) 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Linguistic Fractionalization 0.389 -0.419 0.3 -0.743
(0.041)*** (0.099)*** (0.049)*** (0.111)***
Religious Fractionalization 0.218 -0.257 0.15 -0.263
(0.049)*** (0.085)*** (0.053)*** (0.087)***
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 2690 2690 2690 2690
R-squared 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.98
Table 4: Proportional Representation and the Size of Government
Expenditures Revenues
Notes: The dependent variable is the log per capita expenditures in columns (1) and (2) and log per capita revenues
in columns (3) and (4) both measured in Swiss Franks at 2000 prices. The variable 'proportional representation'
equals one if a canton has a proportional or mixed proportional electoral system in place and zero otherwise.
Population size is calculated as the log of a canton's population, while the urban population measures the
percentage people living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants. All specifications also include year fixed effects
and controls for the age structure of the population, even columns also control for canton fixed effects. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. See also notes to previous table.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (5) (6)
Proportional Representation  -12.655 2.444 0.05 0.587 0.081 0.137 0.066 0.056
(1.327)*** (0.803)*** (0.049) (0.066)*** (0.007)*** (0.010)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)***
Population Size (log) 50.428 -4.792 0.637 -0.611 0.013 0.007 0.018 -0.046
(0.615)*** (2.287)** (0.143)*** (0.230)*** (0.002)*** (0.011) (0.002)*** (0.013)***
% Urban Population -0.236 -0.106 0.001 -0.01 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.024)*** (0.035)*** (0.002) (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Linguistic Fractionalization Index -61.011 -26.005 -0.522 -1.17 -0.061 -0.117 -0.149 -0.21
(3.358)*** (5.554)*** (0.115)*** (0.334)*** (0.014)*** (0.030)*** (0.012)*** (0.027)***
Religious Fractionalization Index 13.74 -46.61 2.375 -0.673 0.403 -0.026 0.231 -0.007
(3.619)*** (5.040)*** (0.137)*** (0.420) (0.013)*** (0.039) (0.012)*** (0.027)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2391 2391 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963
R Squared 0.79 0.96 0.46 0.75 0.65 0.83 0.53 0.83
Notes: The table reports regression estimates where the dependent variable is the size of the canton parliament (columns (1) and (2), the number of parties in the
legislature (columns (3) and (4)), one minus the Herfindahl index of party fragmentation in canton parliaments (columns (5) and (6)) and the percentage of seats held by
the socialist or social democratic party in canton parliaments (columns (7) and (8)). The main independent variable is an indicator equal to one if the canton has adopted
proportional representation and zero otherwise. All specifications include year fixed effects, even columns also control for canton fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
Table 5: Proportional System and Changes in the Legislature
Party Fragmentation Number of Parties Left-Wing Party Number of Legislators(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportional Representation  -0.012 -0.074 0.235 -0.018 -0.085 0.148
(0.021) (0.022)*** (0.084)** (0.021) (0.020)*** (0.083)*
Party Fragmentation 0.291 0.610 0.342 0.581
(0.088)*** (0.129)*** (0.086)*** (0.120)***
PR * Party Fragmentation -0.572 -0.431
(0.142)*** (0.137)***
Number of Parties 0.002 0.007 0.005 -0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Number of Legislators 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0005)* (0.0005)*
% Left-Wing Parties 0.511 0.518 0.434 0.439
(0.091)*** (0.090)*** (0.089)*** (0.088)***
Canton Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YF i d E f f t Y Y Y Y Y Y
Expenditures Revenues
Table 6: Direct and Indirect Effects of Proportional Representation 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1954 1954 1953 1954 1954 1954
R Squared 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Notes: The table reports regression results where the dependent variable is log per capita total expenditures (columns (1)-(3)) and log per capita revenues( c o l u m n s( 4 ) -
(6)). All specifications include year and canton fixed effects and the same control variables than table 4. Columns (1) and (4) reestimate the baseline for the subset of
observations for which we have information on party seats in canton parliaments. Column (2) and (5) add the size of the legislature, number of parties, party fragmentation
(as measured by 1 minus the Herfindahl index) and the percentage of seats held by the socialist or social democratic party. Columns (3) and (6) allow party fragmentation
to have different effects in proportional and plurality systems. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01.   Observations Mean Std.  Dev.
Political System
Executive Elected by Plurality Rule 5081 0.72 0.45
Mandated Electoral Rule for Executive 5081 0.53 0.50
Size of Executive (log) 5056 1.77 0.29
Community has Parliament  5852 0.19 0.40
Legislative Elected by Proportional Rule 778 0.77 0.42
Mandated Electoral Rule for Legislative 1134 0.14 0.35
Size of Local Parliament (log)  670 3.42 0.49
Size of Government 
Administrative Personnel  5852 0.86 5.65
Administrative Personnel (log) 5852 -1.03 1.00
Budget Deficit?  3761 0.31 0.46
Control Variables
Population 5852 2491 7771
Nonemployed (%) 5852 35.91 13.89
Children under 15 (%) 5852 20.58 9.11
Population 65 and Above (%) 5852 31.16 32.43
Employed in Primary Sector (%) 5852 7.42 10.22
Employed in Secondary Sector (%) 5852 36.51 37.00
Protestants (%) 5852 42.47 29.73
Canton Language French or Italian 5852 0.45 0.50
Community Located in the Alps  5805 0.31 0.46
Table 7: Summary Statistics Local Data
Notes: The table shows means, standard deviations and extreme values for our sample of local
communities in 1988, 1994, 1998 and 2005. The size of the executive and parliament (if any) is
expressed in logs. Administrative personnel represents the size of the administration per 100
inhabitants (both in levels and logs). Information on whether the community ran a budget deficit is not
available in 1988. The percentage of nonemployed and employed in primary sector are measued in
terms of the labor force while the percentage of children and protestants in terms of the total
population.  All Border  only
Legislative Executive  Executive Executive 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportional Rule 0.017 -0.038 0.058 0.155
(0.096) (0.042) (0.072) (0.335)
Log Population -0.177 -0.485 -0.756 -0.658***
(0.060)*** (0.024)*** (0.062)*** (0.137)
Canton Language French or Italian -0.255 -0.06 -0.120 -0.164
(0.105)** (0.052) (0.035)*** (0.355)
% Protestants 0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.005
(0.002)* (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.008)
% Children under 15 -0.077 -0.017 -0.020 -0.04
(0.017)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.037)
% Nonemployed -0.043 -0.009 -0.007 -0.01
(0.012)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)* (0.029)
% Employed in Primary Sector 0 0.006 -0.001 -0.034*
(0.007) (0.003)** (0.002) (0.018)
Communities that Adopted Electoral 
Rule
Communities with Mandates
Table 8: Canton Mandates and the Size of Local Government
() () () ()
Community Located in the Alps 0.193 -0.025 -0.030 -0.316
(0.107)* (0.040) (0.051) (0.340)
Population Size Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 620 2381 2679 67
R Squared 0.17 0.37 0.31 0.37
Notes: The table reports regression results where the dependent variable is the log of administrative personnel per capita. The main independent
variable is whether a community has proportional rule in place. The baseline in the first two columns is shown for communities that choose their
electoral system for the legislative (column 1) or executive (column 2). In column (3), we run the same specification on the sample of communities
where the canton mandates the electoral rule for the executive. In column (4), we further restrict the analysis to communities with mandated
proportional rule close to the border with communities where the canton mandates plurality rule. All specifications include year effects. See the
previous table for a description of the control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the canton level. * P<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. Legislative Executive 
(1) (2)
Log Population 0.979 1.189
(0.162)*** (0.069)***
Canton Language French or Italian 1.721 7.568
(0.367)*** (0.656)***
% Protestants -0.015 -0.006
(0.007)* (0.004)
% Children under 15 -0.068 -0.011
(0.046) (0.013)
% Nonemployed 0.085 0.027
(0.027)*** (0.012)**
% Employed in Primary Sector -0.054 -0.017
(0.027)** (0.009)*
Community Located in the Alps 0.651 -1.529
(0.370)** (0.229)***
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects No Yes
Observations 621 2,679
R Squared 0.21 0.43
Log-likelihood -270.88 -917.92
Treatment on the Treated (ATT)  
Nearest Neighbor Matching 0.106 -0.05
(0.127) (0.100)
Biweight Kernel Matching 0.124 -0.049
(0.162) (0.098)
Communities with Common Support
_Treated 436 1,008
_Untreated 177 1,340
Table 9: Propensity Score Matching 
Communities that Adopted Electoral Rule
Notes: The table reports the coefficients from a logit regression where the dependent variable is a
binary indicator equal to one if the community elects the parliament (column (1)) or executive
(column (2)) according to proportional rule and zero otherwise. All specifications include year and
canton fixed effects. The matching procedure implements both nearest neighbors and kernel
matching (using a biweight kernel). We impose common support on the propensity score and also
trim 2 percent of the observations with the highest/lowest values of the predicted propensity score.
The average treatment on the treated effect for both matching method is reported at the bottom
together with the number of observations in the treated and untreated group. Standard errors are
not adjusted for the first stage estimation of the propensity score. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and ***
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